IoT Networking Concepts
IoT encompasses network-connected embedded devices: smart thermostats, IP cameras, smart TVs, industrial sensors, medical devices, connected vehicles, and home automation systems. IoT devices typically have limited CPU, memory, and battery — they use lightweight protocols optimized for constrained environments.
IoT protocols: MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) — lightweight publish/subscribe protocol over TCP, used for sensor data. CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) — like HTTP but optimized for IoT, uses UDP, designed for constrained devices. Zigbee, Z-Wave — short-range mesh protocols for home automation (900 MHz / 2.4 GHz). LoRaWAN — long-range, low-power wide-area network for remote sensors (miles of range, very low data rate). Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) — short range, very low power.
IoT security challenges: many IoT devices ship with default or hardcoded credentials, lack encryption support, cannot be easily patched, and are difficult to monitor. IoT devices should be segmented onto their own VLAN/network, isolated from corporate systems, with firewall rules controlling what they can access.
SCADA and Industrial Control Systems
SCADA systems monitor and control industrial processes: power grids, water treatment, oil pipelines, manufacturing, and building management. They consist of sensors, PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers), RTUs (Remote Terminal Units), HMI (Human-Machine Interfaces), and centralized control software communicating over specialized industrial protocols.
ICS/SCADA protocols: Modbus — legacy serial protocol widely used for PLC communication. DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) — used in utilities and SCADA systems. BACnet — building automation (HVAC, lighting, access control). OPC (OLE for Process Control) — standard for ICS data exchange.
OT vs IT convergence: traditionally, SCADA systems were air-gapped (isolated). Modern requirements for remote monitoring and management are connecting OT (Operational Technology) networks to IT networks and the internet — dramatically increasing attack surface. The Purdue Model defines OT network zones from Level 0 (physical process) to Level 5 (enterprise), with the IDMZ (Industrial DMZ) isolating OT from IT.
IoT and SCADA Security
SCADA and ICS security differs from IT security: availability is often the highest priority (a power plant cannot go offline for patching), systems may run legacy OS (Windows XP), and many ICS protocols have no authentication or encryption. Compromising SCADA can have physical consequences — Stuxnet demonstrated this by damaging Iranian nuclear centrifuges.
Network+ security controls for IoT/SCADA: network segmentation (separate OT VLAN), firewall rules between IT and OT zones, disable unnecessary services and ports, change default credentials, implement monitoring and anomaly detection, use jump servers for remote OT access, conduct regular vulnerability assessments. Physical security is also critical — direct console access to PLCs must be controlled.